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FLAWED REGULATORY POLICY:
THE FUTURE OF FANNIE AND
FREDDIE
Nationalization,
De-Nationalization,
Re-Nationalization: Some
Historical and Comparative
Perspective
Mark A. Edwards*
Introduction
Banks, savings banks, insurance companies . . .
because of their great needs, were foreclosing
mortgages, calling loans, refusing credit. . . . We
were faced by a condition and not a theory. . . . It
was clear that mere appeals from Washington for
confidence and the mere lending of more money
to shaky institutions could not stop this
downward course. A prompt program applied as
quickly as possible seemed to me not only
justified but imperative to our national security.1
The quote above might have come from President Obama,
explaining his recently enacted fiscal stimulus bill,2 but it did
not. It came from Franklin Roosevelt during his second
´ILUHVLGHFKDWµUDGLRDGGUHVVRQ0D\7KDWLWVHHPVVR
apt today may be startling, but it should not be. As this Article
* Associate Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President, Fireside Chat on Banking
Crisis (May 7, 1933), available at http://www.mhric.org/fdr/chat2.html.
2. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123
Stat. 115 (2009) (signed by President Obama on February 17, 2009).
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argues, we have been down this road before several times and
are likely to go down it several more times in the future.
It is difficult to remember it now, but there was once a
time, not so long ago, when the economic crisis now engulfing
WKHZRUOGZDVNQRZQDV´WKHVXESULPHPRUWJDJHFULVLVµ3 That
description of the crisis now seems about as apt as calling the
&KHUQRE\OGLVDVWHU´WKHVWXFNFRROLQJURGLQFLGHQWµDFFXUDWHLQ
its way, but missing some rather important details about the
chain reaction that followed.4 What started as a domestic
problem with irrational lending secured by obscure mortgage
instruments5 has spread with such force and power that the
most powerful banks in the world,6 not to mention several
nations,7 stand on the brink of economic collapse.
It is inevitable, therefore, that the scope of analysis of
what went wrong must expand with the crisis. But it is also
appropriate to remind ourselves that this mess started with the
seemingly mundane act of buying houses. Particularly in the
United States, lending and housing are bound together;;
difficulties in one mean difficulties in the other. And, because
housing is particularly bound up with the idea of ´WKH
$PHULFDQ GUHDPµ D FULVLV LQ EDQNLQJ PD\ XQLTXHO\ FKDOOHQJH
the American sense of self-identity.
The difficulty of memory haunts this crisis in other ways
as well. The failure of policy-makers to remember history is a
direct cause of their inability to come to terms with the crisis.
One goal of this Article is to address the history of the
relationship between societies and their lending institutions,
3. See Senate OKs Bill to Ease Homeowners in Crisis, MSNBC, Dec. 14,
 KWWSZZZPVQEFPVQFRPLG ´7KH OHJLVODWLRQ DSSURYHG
93-1, is the Senate's first attempt to deal with the looming subprime
PRUWJDJHFULVLVµ 
4. See GRIGORI MEDVEDEV, THE TRUTH ABOUT CHERNOBYL 73-91 (Evelyn
Rossiter trans., Basic Books, Inc. 1991) (1989), for an overview of the
Chernobyl disaster.
5. Danielle DiMartino & John V. Duca, The Rise and Fall of Subprime
LETTER,
Nov.
2007,
available
at
Mortgages,
ECON.
http://www.dallasfed.org/research/eclett/2007/el0711.pdf.
6. See, e.g., Neil Irwin & David Cho, A New Architecture for the
Financial World, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2008, at A01 (noting the imminent
collapses of major banks).
7. See, e.g., Daniel Gros, Iceland on the Brink? Options for a Small,
Financially Active Economy in the Current Financial Crisis Environment,
CENTER FOR EUR. POL·Y STUD., Apr. 2008.
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and, in particular, the central role of housing in that
relationship. Like many social relationships, the relationship
between housing, banking, and society has been defined,
imperfectly, by law.
When I proposed this Article topic to the editors of this
symposium, it was a little extreme to speak of nationalization,
at least as that term is commonly defined in the popular
imagination. No more. A survey of headlines from the news
sources8 for the past months makes the point: increasingly,
popular discourse has begun to grapple with a concept that
seems³but, as I argue below, only seems³unprecedented in
the history (and antithetical to the ideology) of our capitalist
economy.
Part I of this Article reviews the long and tumultuous
history of nationalization, de-nationalization, and re-
nationalization of the financial and housing finance industries
in the United States, from their earliest days to the present.
That review leads to two conclusions. FLUVW´QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQµLV
a weak description, at best, which encompasses a wide range of
government interactions with private industry. While the
degree of intervention fluctuates through time in response to
various crises, it is useful to recognize that it is almost never
accurate to characterize financial and housing finance
industries as either fully nationalized or fully de-nationalized.
Second, extensive government intervention in those industries
in the United States has occurred repeatedly.
Part II briefly examines the policy responses to the current
crisis from both the Bush and Obama administrations. Part III
examines the relationship between the financial and housing
finance industries in several other countries with diverse
8. Edmund L. Andrews, Rescue of U.S. Banks Hints at Nationalization,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009, at B1;; Bank Nationalization Speculation Prompts
Confusion, Fear, CNN MONEY, Feb. 20, 2009;; Editorial, Nationalizing the
Bank Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2009, available at http://
roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/nationalizing-the-bank-
problem/;; Neil Irwin & David Cho, A New Architecture for the Financial
World, WASH. POST, Sept. 15, 2008, at A01;; Paul Krugman, Opinion, Banking
on the Brink, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, at A27;; Gretchen Morgenson, The End
of Banking as We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2009, at BU1;; David E.
Sanger, Nationalization Gets a New, Serious Look, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009,
at A1;; Mike Soraghan, Bank Nationalization Attracts GOP Support, THE
HILL, Feb. 15, 2009, available at http://thehill.com/leading-the-news/once-
radical-nationalization-attracts-gop-support-2009-02-15.html.
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histories and systems of government. It reveals surprisingly
similar patterns of government intervention in the industries
across diverse political and economic systems.
Part IV
attempts to fashion a single explanation for both the strange
history of banking and housing finance nationalization in the
United States and the surprisingly similar histories of
nationalization of those industries in diverse political and
economic systems. This part also speculates on the future of
the relationship between instruments of housing finance³
specifically Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac³and the Federal
Government.
I. De-Nationalization and Re-Nationalization of the
Banking and Housing Finance Industries in the United
States
The history of banking in the United States is really the
history of competing impulses, one motivated by ideology, the
other by pragmatism. Two ideological strains have combined
to make the United States ever reluctant to embrace centrally
planned intervention in the financial industries: the preference
for federalism9 and the preference for relatively laissez-faire
capitalism.10 Against these impulses, pragmatic responses to
crises have led repeatedly to attempts at centrally planned
regulatory intervention into lending. It is this dynamic that
has produced a tumultuous and even schizophrenic
relationship between American society and its banks. The
difficulties of this relationship are especially acute with regard
to housing finance.
A. Nationalization: The First Bank of the United States
To begin at the beginning: at the urging of Alexander
Hamilton, and with considerable opposition from opponents of
9. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Elastic
Commerce Clause: A Political Theory of American Federalism, 47 VAND. L.
REV. 1355 (1994);; Harry N. Scheiber, Redesigning the Architecture of
Federalism ² An American Tradition: Modern Devolution Policies in
Perspective, 14 YALE L. & POL·Y REV. 227 (1996).
10. See generally THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT (Harry N.
Schreiber ed., 1998).
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federal power, led prominently by Thomas Jefferson, the First
Bank of the United States was chartered in 1791.11 Jefferson
was deeply suspicious that a national bank in general³and
Hamilton in particular³would be tempted to amass power.12
7KH %DQN·V ODUJHVW VKDUHKROGHU ZDV WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV
which held a 20% interest.13 The Bank played an important
role in financing the Federal Government, but it was
considerably less important to the economic life of the country
than were the numerous banks chartered in the individual
states.14 Those banks issued their own notes, which became
the bulk of the United States money supply.15 Opposition from
states-rights advocates led to the dissolution of the National
Bank when its first twenty-year charter expired.16
B. De-Nationalization: Washington is Burning
A year later, in 1812, a crisis that makes the current one
look relatively trivial caused the nation to reconsider its
distaste for central banking. The United States found itself in
a war in which Washington itself was burned to the ground by
an invading army.17 That happened in part because the
Federal Government had no easy way to borrow money to
finance a war effort.18 Moreover, the unregulated state and
private banks were of no help;; they turned out to be issuing
notes without sufficient reserves to cover them.19
C. Re-Nationalization: The Second Bank of the United States
By 1816, the Second National Bank of the United States

11. See, e.g., JOHN STEELE GORDON, AN EMPIRE OF WEALTH 78-79 (2004).
12. Id.
13. EDWARD S. KAPLAN, THE BANK OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY ix (1999).
14. Warren E. Weber, Early State Banks in the United States: How
Many were There and Where did they Exist?, 30 FED. RES. BANK OF MINN. Q.
REV. 28 (Sept. 2006).
15. See KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 27.
16. Id. at 32-33.
17. See generally JOHN K. MAHON, WAR OF 1812 (1991).
18. See KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 38.
19. Id. at 38-43.
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was born of necessity.20 Moreover, the first federal attempts to
intervene in the management of the banking industry resulted
in tighter restrictions on the ability of state and private banks
to issue notes.21 By 1816, the relationship between the United
States and its banks had already assumed some of the
character it retains today: ideological preferences for weak
federal power giving way to the necessity of greater regulation
in response to a crisis.
D. De-Nationalization: The Free Banking / Intermittent Panic
Years
The Second National Bank, like the First, did its job well
enough that it soon put itself out of business.22 Stability
returned to the financial system,23 and the apparent need for
an ideologically offensive central federal banking authority
melted away with the crisis it had corrected. Indeed, it was
during this period that the first depositor insurance system
was enacted in New York, protecting deposits in the event of
bank failure through an assessment on banks.24 State banks
were sound again, and ideological preference against central
authority was no longer an unaffordable luxury. In 1836, the
Second Bank died, like the First, at the age of twenty.25
For the next thirty-five years, the United States did
without either a central planning authority or significant
federal regulatory oversight of private banks.26 All banks were
chartered by the states, largely under their own changing
standards.27 Almost immediately after the Second Bank was
dissolved, the country suffered a banking crisis, known as the
Panic of 1837.28 State banks failed and state governments
20. Id. at 49-55;; see also Hugh Rockoff, Banking and Finance, 1789-
1914, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
LONG NINETEENTH CENTURY, at 643, 647-49 (Stanley L. Engerman & Robert
E. Gallman eds., 2000).
21. See KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 69-70.
22. Id. at 160.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., GORDON, supra note 11, at 113-31.
27. See, e.g., id. at 122.
28. See id. at 130.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/16

6

130

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:124

defaulted on their debts.29 Foreign investment in the United
States suffered, and the economy did not recover for several
Nonetheless, the ideological preference for de-
years.30
centralized economic authority was strong enough that the
national bank was not revived.
In the ensuing years, until the Civil War forever re-wrote
the relationship between the states and the Federal
Government, economic and financial authority remained
decentralized on the federalist model.31 These years were
marked by intermittent panics that caused some state bank
failures, but also by general economic development caused by
westward expansion and the growth of the industrial base in
the Northeast.32
The Civil War dramatically altered both the Federal
*RYHUQPHQW·V QHHGIRUFHQWUDOEDQNLQJ33 and the power of the
Federal Government in relation to state banks.34 With the
most ardent states-rights supporters gone from the scene
because they had actually seceded from the Union (the
ultimate assertion of states-rights), Congress passed the
National Bank Act, which, as amended, imposed taxes on state
banks that virtually forced them to re-charter as national
banks, thus submitting themselves to federal regulatory
supervision.35 However, even in the absence of the most ardent
states-rights supporters, Congress did not create a central
bank subject to federal control, such as a Third National Bank.
Instead, it merely increased both the number of de-centralized
banks subject to federal regulatory oversight and increased the
degree of regulation over those banks. The result was a more
stable banking system, but one without a central planning

29. See, e.g., id.
30. Id. at 131.
31. See id. at 191-204 (discussing the Civil War and its impact on the
American economy).
32. See id.
33. KAPLAN, supra note 13, at 1. Lacking a central bank from which to
obtain funding for the war, the Federal Government simply printed more
currency, causing a sharp increase in inflation and lowering the value of that
currency. Id.
34. See RICHARD H. TIMBERLAKE, MONETARY POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES 84-103 (1993).
35. National Bank Act, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863). See generally Veazie
Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869).
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authority.
Following the Civil War, the federalist impulse toward
decentralization returned.
State banks were freed from
onerous federal tax burdens and reserve requirements.36 The
return of decentralization and less intrusive regulation also
brought back the intermittent crises and panics that had
characterized previous eras.37 In a now familiar pattern, the
less-regulated banks were discovered to have lent money too
freely and to have maintained insufficient reserves.38 Once
again, the country experienced an epidemic of bank collapses.39
And, once again, as a result, the country was prepared to
partially set aside its ideological distaste for central authority
and laissez-faire economics.
E. A Little Re-Nationalization: The Creation of the Federal
Reserve
In 1913, after several years of wrangling, Congress enacted
WKH)HGHUDO5HVHUYH$FW WKH´$FWµ 40 The Act created the basic
Federal Reserve structure that exists today. The Federal
5HVHUYH %RDUG ´)HGHUDO 5HVHUYHµ  ZRXOG QRW KDYH WKH
centralized power of a central bank based upon European
models, but it carried considerably more federal regulatory
authority than had existed since the demise of the Second
The Federal Reserve would oversee a
National Bank.41
network of twelve regional or District Federal Reserve Banks
´'LVWULFW %DQNVµ  SULYDWH FRUSRUDWLRQV UXQ E\ DSSRLQWHG
private citizens.42 The District Banks, in turn, would act as the
36. See, e.g., John Steele Gordon, A Short Banking History of the United
States, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2008, at A17.
37. Crises, panics, and collapses occurred in 1873, 1884, 1893, and 1907.
Elmus Wicker, Banking Panics in the US: 1873-1933, EH.NET ENCYCLOPEDIA,
Sept. 4, 2001, http://eh.net/encyclopedia/article/wicker.banking.panics.us.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 261 (1913). See generally ALLAN
H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 1913-1951 (2003);; DONALD
R. WELLS, THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (2004).
41. See MELTZER, supra note 40, at 65-73, for a discussion of the passage
of the Federal Reserve Act.
42. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE
SYSTEM: PURPOSES AND FUNCTIONS 3, 6-11 (9th ed. 2005), available at http://
www.federalreserve.gov/pf/pdf/pf_complete.pdf.
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EDQNV· EDQN, issuing currency and lending money to member
banks at a rate determined by the Board.43 The District Banks
were also authorized to buy and sell United States debt
obligations, enabling the Federal Government to borrow money
DQG IXUWKHU HQDEOLQJ WKH 'LVWULFW %DQNV WR LQIOXHQFH EDQNV·
lending activities.44 Member banks were subject to regulatory
oversight.45
,Q WKH ZRUGV RI WKH )HGHUDO 5HVHUYH LWVHOI LW EHFDPH ´DQ
XQXVXDOPL[WXUHRISXEOLFDQGSULYDWHHOHPHQWVµWKDWWRJHWKHU
SURGXFHG D ´GHFHQWUDOL]HG FHQWUDO EDQNµ46
Conservatives
denounced the Act, and the authority it created, as a
government takeover of private industry.47 The editorial board
of the New York Times gave clear voice to that concern:
[P]olitical control over the banking system of the
country is secured. . . .
. . . If anything is lacking to the
completeness of this centralized control it must
be in respect to some detail that escaped the
attention of the authors of the bill.
....
. . . It reflects the rooted dislike and distrust
of banks and bankers that has been for many
years a great moving force in the Democratic
Party . . . . The measure goes to the very
extreme in establishing absolute political control
over the business of banking.48
In its initial years, the Federal Reserve worked well
enough, along with general economic prosperity that resulted
from supplying European powers at war with raw materials
43. Id. at 6-11, 16.
44. Id. at 37-38.
45. Id. at 4-5.
46. Federal Reserve Education, The Federal Reserve Structure Tour,
http://www.federalreserveeducation.org/fed101_html/structure/tour/tour.htm
(last visited Nov. 21, 2009).
47. Similar arguments, of course, are common-place today. See, e.g.,
0DUN /HLERYLFK ¶6RFLDOLVP· %RR +LVV 5HSHDW, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2009, at
WK 1.
48. Editorial, A Radical Banking Measure, N. Y. TIMES, June 21, 1913, at
8.
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and manufactured goods, that it fell into the same conundrum
that helped kill the Second National Bank: it did not seem
particularly necessary to cede power to an ideologically
distasteful central regulatory authority. As a result, the
District Banks were reluctant to tighten lending to member
banks despite their speculative lending and investments and
despite low bank capitalization and reserves.49
The relatively weak position held by the Federal Reserve
would soon come to haunt it.50 Speculative investments and
poorly secured debt triggered a stock market crash, which led
to decreased consumer spending, thus leading to high
unemployment and, finally, to further decreased consumer
spending and massive loan defaults.51 Those loan defaults,
together with speculative investing and low cash reserves,
combined to trigger an epidemic of bank failures, which
impoverished depositors and led to yet more loan defaults.52
The result was an economic crisis that engulfed the world.53
F.

A Lot More Nationalization: New Dealing with the Once
and Future Crisis
1. Banking Reform

Faced with the greatest economic FROODSVH LQ WKH QDWLRQ·V
history, the Hoover Administration found itself paralyzed by its
ideological opposition to central planning and regulatory
authority.54
a. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation
Hoover and his administration reluctantly created the
5HFRQVWUXFWLRQ )LQDQFH &RUSRUDWLRQ ´5)&µ  EXW VDZ LW DV
49. MELTZER, supra note 40, at 248-52.
50. See id. at 264-65.
51. See generally ELMUS WICKER, THE BANKING PANICS OF THE GREAT
DEPRESSION (2000).
52. Id. at 46-47.
53. Id.
54. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE
COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 477 (1958) (noting that Hoover regarded the New
'HDODVDQWLWKHWLFDOWR´WKHZKROHSKLORVRSK\RILQGLYLGXDOOLEHUW\µ 
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´SULPDULO\ D SV\FKRORJLFDO ZHDSRQµ GHVLJQHG WR UHVWRUH SXEOLF
confidence, rather than as an actual instrument of policy.55
8QGHU +RRYHU WKH 5)&·V IXQFWLRQ ZDV VWULFWO\ OLPLWHG WR
making small emergency loans for banks and insurance
companies only if the companies could provide adequate
collateral security.56 Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills did
not bother to try to disguise his distaste for the institution,
UHDVVXULQJ FRQVHUYDWLYHV WKDW ´WKH VRoner it is created . . . the
OHVVXVHZHZLOOKDYHWRPDNHRILWµ57 President Hoover shared
the 6HFUHWDU\·VGLVFRPIRUWZKHQ&RQJUHVVDWWHPSWHGWRH[SDQG
the lending powers of the RFC, Hoover denounced the idea in
terms that made it clear that he found central planning and
IHGHUDO UHJXODWRU\ DXWKRULW\ DEKRUUHQW ´1HYHU EHIRUHµ KH
FODLPHG´KDVVRGDQJHURXVDVXJJHVWLRQEHHQVHULRXVO\PDGHWR
RXUFRXQWU\µ58
By the time President Roosevelt was inaugurated in 1933,
ideology was a luxury neither policy-makers nor the public
could afford. Pragmatism was again a necessity. The post-
ideological pragmatism of the New Deal was perhaps best
embodied in the flamboyant figure most responsible for the
implementation of the evolving finance system: Jesse Jones.
Jones once claimed that the three most important ingredients
IRU KLV KDSSLQHVV ZHUH ´IDPLO\ UHOLJLRQ DQG PRQH\µ59
DOWKRXJKDVKLVWRULDQ$UWKXU6FKOHVLQJHUZU\O\QRWHG´>V@RPH
PLJKW ZRQGHU ZKHWKHU WKLV DFFXUDWHO\ VWDWHG WKH SULRULW\µ60
Roosevelt placed Jones at the head of the RFC, where, with
expanded powers, he had a great impact.61 6FKOHVLQJHU·V
description of Jones warrants quotation in full:
He was profane and taciturn in the Texas
manner, loved power, was indifferent to ideology,
never read books, had no sentimental illusions
about the underdog, and kept his word. He could
do business with anybody, even New Dealers,
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 426-27.
Id. at 427.
Id. (quoting Secretary of the Treasury Ogden Mills).
Id. (quoting President Herbert Hoover).
Id. at 426 (quoting Jesse Jones).
Id.
Id. at 427, 430.
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even Wall Street.62
The R)&·V JRDO ZDV WR KDYH EDQNV OHQG WR EXVLQHVVHV
again. In order to lend, banks needed capital, obtained not
through loans that further weakened their balance sheets, but
through the issuance and sale of preferred stock to the RFC.63
Banking industry leaderV UHVLVWLQJ WKH ´WKUHDW RI JRYHUQPHQW
FRQWURO RI WKH EDQNLQJ V\VWHPµ DW ILUVW UHIXVHG WR VHOO HTXLW\
interests to the RFC.64 Jones warned that if the banks refused
to cooperate, the Federal Government would begin loaning to
businesses directly, bypassing banks entirely and thereby
destroying private commercial banking.65 In essence, the
Roosevelt Administration presented the banking industry with
a choice: partial nationalization of banks through preferred
stock purchases or complete nationalization of baQNV· OHQGLQJ
function.66 Faced with that choice, bankers chose partial
nationalization and sold preferred stock to the RFC.67
b. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
To restore public confidence in banks and stem the cycle of
panicked depositor bank runs, the Banking Act of 1933 created
WKH )HGHUDO 'HSRVLW ,QVXUDQFH &RUSRUDWLRQ ´)',&µ 
guaranteeing the availability of retail deposits.68 With that
guarantee, however, came much greater regulatory oversight.69
In addition, banks were required to separate their commercial
and investment bank functions.70 Within two years, the
62. Id. at 426.
63. Id. at 427-28.
64. Id. at 428.
65. Id. at 428.
66. Id. at 428-29.
67. Id. at 429-30.
68. Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). The Banking Act
was commonly known as the Glass-Steagall Act. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Glass-
Steagall
Act
(1933),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/subjects/g/glass_steagall_
act_1933/index.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2009) [hereinafter Glass-Steagall
Act (1933)];; MURRAY N. ROTHBARD, A HISTORY OF MONEY AND BANKING IN THE
UNITED STATES: THE COLONIAL ERA TO WWII, at 342-43 (2002).
69. See, e.g., Glass-Steagall Act (1933), supra note 68;; ROTHBARD, supra
note 68, at 342-43.
70. See, e.g., Glass-Steagall Act (1933), supra note 68.
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Banking Act of 1935 again broadened the powers of the Federal
Reserve, increasing both its supervisory regulatory power over
banks and its ability to use interest rates on loans to banks to
control commercial lending practices.71
2. Housing Finance Reform
The Roosevelt Administration soon turned its focus to the
housing finance system.72 One pernicious effect of the banking
crisis was the paralysis of housing finance.73 Similar to the
current crisis, the Great Depression was preceded by an
unprecedented spike in home prices and the accumulation of
mortgage debt, both fueled by lax lending standards.74
Defaults and foreclosures increased dramatically, and banks
simply stopped lending for home purchases.75 The Roosevelt
Administration devised a number of pragmatic responses to the
problem, which were revised in accordance with their
effectiveness in practice.76
a. The Federal Home Loan Bank System and the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
The Roosevelt Administration recognized that credit was
frozen for home lending institutions such as savings and loans
and mutual savings banks.77 It empowered the Federal Home
/RDQ%DQN ´)+/%µ FUHDWHGLQWRSURYLGHORDQVWRWKHVH
institutions, so that they in turn could lend to home buyers.78

71. Banking Act of 1935, ch. 88, 49 Stat. 684 (1935). See also JANE W.
'·$RISTA, THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. FINANCE: FEDERAL RESERVE MONETARY
POLICY, 1915-1935, at 182-94 (1994).
72. David C. Wheelock, The Federal Response to Home Mortgage
Distress: Lessons from the Great Depression, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS
REV.,
May/June
2008,
at
137,
available
at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/05/Wheelock.pdf.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. $FFRUGLQJ WR VWDWLVWLFV FLWHG E\ :KHHORFN DQ DVWRXQGLQJ ´ RI
urban, owner-RFFXSLHG KRPHVµ VXEMHFW WR ILUVW PRUWJDJHV ZHUH LQ GHIDXOW E\
January 1, 1934. Id. at 138.
76. Id. at 140.
77. Id. at 141.
78. Id.
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In 1934, Congress passed the National Housing Act,79 which,
among other things, created the Federal Savings and Loan
,QVXUDQFH &RUSRUDWLRQ ´)6/,&µ  DV DQ DUP RI WKH )+/%
which essentially served as an FDIC for home lending
institutions.80 It provided insurance for retail deposits at those
institutions so that consumers would have the confidence to
make deposits, which could then be loaned out for housing
purchases.81 Together, the FHLB and the FSLIC worked to
increase liquidity at home lending institutions in order to
trigger a chain reaction that would reverse the epidemic of
foreclosures.82 The greater availability of loans from home
lending institutions could lower the cost of borrowing for home
buyers. More home buyers could create demand in the housing
market and slowly raise home values, which had plummeted.
Rising home values could allow some homeowners to refinance
their mortgage loans to avoid foreclosure.
b. 7KH+RPH2ZQHUV·/RDQ&RUSRUDWion
Many delinquent mortgages could not be saved by
refinancing if home owners had to wait for home values to
rise.83 In response, the Roosevelt Administration created the
SXEOLFSULYDWH K\EULG +RPH 2ZQHUV· /RDQ &RUSRUDWLRQ
(financed publicly, in part, and partly through tax-favored
private investment) in 1933.84 This institution had a simple
but crucial mission: buy delinquent mortgages from home
lending institutions, and then work with home owners to
refinance them on less risky and more responsible terms.85 As
a result, banks were able to sell the mortgages that they
wanted to get rid of the most, which reduced their bad debt and
For homeowners, short-term,
increased their liquidity.86
adjustable rate, and balloon mortgages were converted to long-

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934).
Wheelock, supra note 72, at 141.
Id.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 141.
Id.
Id. at 142.
Id.
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term, fixed-rate mortgages.87 In order to qualify for the
restructured loans, borrowers were required to present proof of
sufficient income relative to their debt.88 In 1934, HOLC
activity dwarfed private home finance lending activities.89 At
the height of its activities, the HOLC held almost 20% of all
home mortgages in the United States.90 In other words, an
agency of the Federal Government held the mortgage to one-in-
five homes in the country.91
c. The Federal Housing Administration
In addition to the creation of the FSLIC, the National
Housing Act of 1934 had two other major impacts on the
structure of housing finance in the United States. First, it
FUHDWHG WKH )HGHUDO +RXVLQJ $GPLQLVWUDWLRQ ´)+$µ 92 To
encourage responsible lending standards by home lending
institutions, the FHA offered to insure mortgage loans that met
its quality and risk standards.93 The FHA required that the
loans it insured were fixed-rate, long-term, and had a
maximum loan-to-value ratio of 80% (in other words, home
buyers were required to make a 20% down payment).94
d. The Federal National Mortgage Association
The last major impact of the National Housing Act of 1934
was that it authorized the creation of an agency to purchase
mortgages from home lending institutions and sell them to
investors. Jesse Jones and the RFC stepped in at the request
of President Roosevelt and created the Federal National
0RUWJDJH $VVRFLDWLRQ ´)10$µ  QRZ NQRZQ RI FRXUVH DV
Fannie Mae.95 The FNMA created a secondary market in
which home lending institutions could sell mortgages that met
FNMA quality standards.96 In other words, the FNMA would
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 142-43.
Id. at 142.
Id.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id.
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buy mortgage loans from home lending institutions at some
percentage of their present value.97 The lenders would receive
a one-time cash payment and be relieved of any risk from the
KRPHEX\HU·VSRWHQWLDOGHIDXOW98 That risk was transferred to
the FNMA.99 Not only did banks receive a great incentive to
increase their home lending activity, the FNMA was able,
through its purchase standards, to impose quality standards
that lasted for decades.
Not only did the discreet agencies fulfill their individual
functions well, but they also operated well together as a
housing finance system. The FHLB provided liquidity,100 the
HOLC purchased and refinanced delinquent mortgages,101 the
FHA insured quality mortgages,102 and the FNMA created a
secondary market on which quality mortgages could be sold,
increasing lender liquidity, removing risk, and standardizing
quality.103 In many ways, the FNMA was the most spectacular
success of all the housing finance reforms. It not only
contributed to housing finance stabilization, it actually created
a massive and thriving secondary market in mortgages that
became the principle engine of the post-ZDU´$PHULFDQGUHDPµ
of home ownership.104
G. Post-Depression De-Nationalization: The Long March from
Economic Crisis to Deregulation to Economic Crisis
The New Deal housing finance system worked so well in
the years following the Depression that three things happened.
95. Id. at 145.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Daniel J. McDonald & Daniel L. Thornton, A Primer on the Mortgage
Market and Mortgage Finance, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Jan./Feb.
2008, at 31, 36, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/
08/01/McDonald.pdf.
99. Id.
100. Wheelock, supra note 72, at 140.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. ,QIDFW)DQQLH0DH·VKHDGTXDUWHUVDUHORFDWHGRQ$PHULFDQ'UHDP
Way in Reston, Virginia.
Fannie Mae in Reston, Va., http://www.
superpages.com/bp/Reston-VA/Fannie-Mae-L2041630424.htm (last visited on
Nov. 8, 2009).
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First, access to home ownership increased dramatically and
came to be thought of as a critical component of the American
dream of middle-class prosperity.105 Second, many people
forgot that the system was there, even as it continued to
function. Indeed, continuing popular confusion about the
control of, and roles played by, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
may owe itself, to a large extent, to the invisibility of the
secondary mortgage market they created.106 Third, to those for
whom central planning and extensive regulatory oversight was
ideologically distasteful, it no longer seemed very necessary.107
In a Groundhog Day108²like repeat of the past, as the crisis
receded from memory, regulatory oversight and central
planning were scaled back.109
The HOLC was the first victim of its success. It had
played a major role in ending the foreclosure epidemic, as it
acquired an enormous percentage of private home lending
LQVWLWXWLRQV· GHOLQTXHQW ORDQV ´WR[LF DVVHWVµ LQ WRGD\·V
terminology, and restructured them into performing assets.110
But those performing assets were a tremendous temptation to
the now-rescued lenders, and they put intense pressure on
Congress to require HOLC to liquidate, selling its assets at fire
sale prices to the lenders it had once rescued.111 HOLC
resisted, but many were sympathetic to the bankers, since the
massive presence of a government agency, now essentially in
competition with private industry, struck many in Washington
as ideologically abhorrent.112
As the National Bureau
delicately but aptly summarized the debate:
105. See, e.g., BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP·T OF COMMERCE,
TRACKING THE AMERICAN DREAM: FIFTY YEARS OF HOUSING CHANGES (1994),
available at http://www.census.gov/apsd/www/statbrief/sb94_8.pdf.
106. See FREDDIE MAC, FOCUS ON: FREDDIE MAC   ´)RU WKH PRVW
SDUW ZKDW ZH GR LV LQYLVLEOH WR FRQVXPHUVµ  available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/mbs/docs/fs_freddiemac.pdf.
107. See McDonald & Thornton, supra note 98, at 35 (noting that the
secondary mortgage market became increasingly attractive to private
competitors throughout the late twentieth century).
108. GROUNDHOG DAY (Columbia Pictures 1993).
109. See Wheelock, supra note 72, at 139-45.
110. Id. at 141-44.
111. See C. LOWELL HARRISS, HISTORY AND POLICIES OF THE HOME
OWNERS· LOAN CORPORATION 159-81 (1951) GLVFXVVLQJ WKH ´>I@LQDQFLDO
>O@LTXLGDWLRQRIWKH+RPH2ZQHUV·/RDQ&RUSRUDWLRQµ 
112. See, e.g., id.
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While private agencies were understandably
DWWUDFWHG WR WKH +2/&·V DVVHWV WKH &RUSRUDWLRQ
opposed the principle of transferring its
mortgages to private institutions. . . .
. . . Not the least was the question of the
proper relationship between public and private
institutions in the financial system, and whether
an agency set up to aid private finance in time of
economic depression was justified in holding on
to the assets so acquired until their final
liquidation in an improved economic climate.
This question was raised directly or implicitly
throughout the discussions. There was generally
an acceptance of the principle that, other things
being equal, private facilities should be used in
preference to government. The fact that the
government through the HOLC had materially
DVVLVWHG WKH QDWLRQ·V ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV ZDV
pointed out, presumably with the inference that
these institutions would be inconsistent (and
ungrateful) if they forced the HOLC to terminate
its activities.113
Inconsistent and ungrateful or not, in 1943 the lenders got
their wish as Congress passed a bill requiring HOLC to
liquidate and sell its assets. HOLC was completely liquidated
by 1951.114
During the 1950s, the FHA also began to lose its
influence.115 Home lenders began to offer loans with lower
down-payment ratios than the FHA would insure.116 But the
)+$·V UHIXVDO WR LQVXUH WKH ORDQV GLG QRW FXUWDLO ULVN\ ORDQ
origination, as it had been designed to do;; instead, private
insurers entered the market offering to insure those loans.117
Over time, the percent of home loans insured by the FHA
113. Id. at 173.
114. Id.
115. See John M. Quigley, Federal Credit and Insurance Programs:
Housing, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., July/Aug. 2006, at 281, 283-84.
116. Id. at 285.
117. Id.
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steadily decreased as low down-payment, adjustable-rate loans
became more and more commonplace.118
In 1968, Fannie Mae was nearly fully privatized;; it became
D ´JRYHUQPHQW-VSRQVRUHG HQWLW\µRU*6( PHDQLQJ LW UHWDined
certain tax and borrowing privileges, but its stock was now
held by private investors.119 Fannie Mae continued to purchase
mortgage loans from their originating lenders and sell them on
the secondary market. In 1970, Congress created a second
GSE, Freddie Mac, to create a parallel secondary market for
mortgages originated by savings and loans.120 It too was owned
by private investors.
Although Congress retained some
persuasive power over the GSEs through the threat of revoking
or curtailing their privileges, the corporations were now
independent of any direct or indirect government control. After
privatization, both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac began to
securitize pools of mortgages and sell those securities on the
secondary market.121 These instruments became known as
MBSs.122
Finally, the FSLIC and the FHLB, as insurers to savings
and loans, became insolvent as a result of the wave of savings
and loan failures in the 1980s.123 Congress declined to rescue
them, and by the 1990s most of the New Deal institutions had
been either fundamentally altered or disbanded entirely.
H. Preliminary Conclusions
From this review of the history of the cyclic ebb and flow of
central planning and federal regulation over the banking and
housing finance industries, two conclusions are apparent.
First, the concept of nationalization itself is not particularly

118. Id. at 285-87.
119. Id. at 294.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Leland C. Brendsel, 6HFXULWL]DWLRQ·V 5ROH LQ +RXVLQJ
Finance: The Special Contributions of the Government-Sponsored Enterprises,
in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 19-22 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J.
Fischman, eds., 2d prtg. 1997).
122. See, e.g., id.
123. Both were ultimately abolished under the Financial Institutions
Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989. Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat.
183, tit. IV, sec. 401 (1989).

19

2009] NATIONALIZATION, DE-NATIONALIZATION

143

useful and may do little more than stir ideological opposition.124
It is much more useful to think of central planning and
regulatory control as a continuum along which the United
States has moved back and forth. The banking and housing
finance industries of the United States have never been either
completely under Federal Government control or completely
free of its control.
6HFRQG LI ZH GHILQH ´QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQµ WR PHDQ IDLUO\
extensive government intervention in the banking and housing
finance industries, it is not as foreign a concept as it may
appear. In fact, it is a consistently recurring phenomenon
throughout the 8QLWHG 6WDWHV· KLVWRU\ RIWHQ IRU YHU\ JRRG
reason. The shock and wonder expressed by some politicians
and commentators at the prospect of extensive intervention,
e.g., nationalization, reveals a lack of historical perspective.125
Like Miranda in The Tempest,126 many have failed to realize
that this is not a brave new world;; it is new only to them.
II. Re-Nationalization: Dealing Again with the Former and
Present Economic Crisis
My purpose here is to review only very briefly the causes of
the current crisis and the plans currently being enacted to
combat it. The focus here is to make the case that both the
crisis and the proposed responses to it were foreseeable because
they fit well within the pattern of de-nationalization and re-
nationalization of the banking and housing finance industries
that runs throughout the history of the United States.
The 1990s saw rapid growth in the number of barely
regulated private enterprises, such as Countrywide, offering
´VXESULPHµOHQGLQJWRKRPHEX\HUVZKRFRXOGQRWKDYHTXDOLILHG
124. Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi recently
DVNHGUKHWRULFDOO\´:RXOGZHKDYHHYHUWKRXJKWZHZRXOGVHHWKHGD\ZKHQ
ZH·G EH XVLQJ WKDW WHUPLQRORJ\"  ¶1DWLRQDOL]DWLRQ RI WKH EDQNV"·µ  'DYLG (
Sanger, Nationalization Gets a New, Serious Look, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2009,
DW $  %XW DV 5HSUHVHQWDWLYH 0D[LQH :DWHUV UHFHQWO\ ZDUQHG ´7KH ZRUG
¶QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQ·VFDUHVWKHKHOORXWRISHRSOHµ6RUDJKDQsupra note 8.
125. 2WKHUVKRZHYHUKDYHUHFRJQL]HGWKDW´QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQµKDVSOD\HG
a recurring role in the American banking and housing finance industries.
See, e.g., Krugman, supra QRWH  ´>,@VQ·W QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQ XQ-American? No,
LW·VDV$PHULFDQDVDSSOHSLHµ 
126. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 5, sc. 1.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol30/iss1/16

20

144

PACE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:124

for either an FHA-insured mortgage or Fannie Mae purchase-
eligible mortgage.127 Moreover, these lenders found it lucrative
to securitize packages of the mortgages they originated and sell
them to investors, such as commercial banks, investment
banks, and mutual funds.128 $V )DQQLH 0DH·V VKDUH RI WKH
secondary mortgage and MBS market fell in the face of such
competition, it lowered its quality standards to recapture
market share lost to the subprime lenders.129
)URPXQWLO´KRPHSULFHVURVHDWDQDQQXDOUDWH
RI  SHUFHQWµ130 Thereafter, home prices began to fall and
some borrowers, particularly those in the subprime holding
short-term mortgage loans, found that their homes were now
worth less than they owed, making refinancing the full amount
owed impossible.131 Unable either to refinance the loan or pay
the amount owed in full, foreclosure rates began to
skyrocket.132 As foreclosure rates increased, the quality of
MBSs decreased.133 Large institutional investors, including
commercial and investment banks, found that large
percentages of their MBS assets had been rendered
worthless.134 Lending dried up as a result,135 which led to
greater economic slowdown and more foreclosures, and the
cycle began to repeat.136 That is largely where we find
ourselves today.

127. Charles Duhigg, Pressured to Take More Risk, Fannie Reached
Tipping Point, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2008, at A1.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. McDonald & Thornton, supra note 98, at 31.
131. Dina ElBoghdady & Sarah Cohen, The Growing Foreclosure Crisis,
WASH. POST, Jan. 17, 2009, at A01.
132. Id.
133. See
Posting
of
Price
Fishback
to
Freakonomics,
http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/12/the-financial-meltdown-
now-and-then/ (May 12, 2009, 14:31 EST).
134. Id.
135. Bryan Keogh, Libor Rises, Commercial Paper Slumps as Credit
Oct.
2,
2008,
Freeze
Deepens,
BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=azi5ZFVQ4iic.
136. Fishback, supra note 133.
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A. The Bank Bailouts
1. Bailout I: TARP
The Bush Administration, like the Hoover Administration
before it, found its ability to react to the developing crisis
hamstrung by ideology. Central planning and government
investment in private enterprise were simply not tools that
neo-conservatives could bring themselves to wield. Lacking the
will to intervene systematically in the banking industry, yet
unable to avoid responding to the deepening crisis, the Bush
Administration seemed to adopt an ad hoc approach. The
7URXEOHG $VVHW 5HOLHI 3URJUDP ´7$53µ  HPERGLHG WKLV
approach. As first proposed by former-Treasury Secretary
Henry Paulson in a three-page bill submitted to Congress on
September 21, 2008, the program envisioned the Treasury
wielding the power to purchase mortgage-backed securities by
spending up to $700 billion in emergency funds with complete
and unreviewable discretion.137 In essence, Paulson seemed to
have been assigned the role of Mary Bailey during the bank
run scene from ,W·V D:RQGHUIXO /LIH138: rushing into the crisis
with a wad of cash in time to prevent an immediate collapse of
lending institutions, but with no plan for the future.
As noted above, Paulson first indicated that the Treasury
would use TARP funds to purchase bad debt, or toxic assets,
IURPOHQGHUVWKHUHE\UHPRYLQJWKHDVVHWVIURPEDQNV·OHGJHUV
and freeing them to begin lending money again³much as the
HOLC had done during the Great Depression.139 Then, he
seems to have reversed course, intent instead on infusing
lenders with liquidity in order to spark lending activity to
137. Text of Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 2008,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/21/business/21draftcnd.html.
$V RULJLQDOO\ SURSRVHG 3DXOVRQ ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ HPSRZHUHG ´to purchase,
and to make and fund commitments to purchase, on such terms and
conditions as determined by the Secretary, mortgage-related assets from any
ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQ KDYLQJ LWV KHDGTXDUWHUV LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHVµ  Id. He
DOVR ZRXOG KDYH EHHQ HPSRZHUHG WR GHVLJQDWH ´ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DV
ILQDQFLDO DJHQWV RI WKH JRYHUQPHQWµ DQG DOO RI KLV GHFLVLRQV ZHUH WR KDYH
EHHQ´QRQ-reviewablHDQGFRPPLWWHGWRDJHQF\GLVFUHWLRQµDQGFRXOG´QRWEH
UHYLHZHGE\DQ\FRXUWRIODZRUDQ\DGPLQLVWUDWLYHDJHQF\µId.
138. IT·S A WONDERFUL LIFE (Liberty Films II 1946).
139. Fishback, supra note 133.
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businesses, similar to the function once provided by the FHLB,
but directed at insurers, investment banks, and commercial
banks rather than home lending institutions.140 However, the
banks infused with cash were not, in fact, required to lend it.141
Acting rationally in the absence of such a requirement and in
the face of a grave economic crisis, they instead held the cash
in reserve, protecting their shareholders but defeating the
purpose of the cash infusion.142
2. Bailout II: CAP
The Obama Administration, through the Treasury
Department, has begun implementation of the Capital
$VVLVWDQFH 3URJUDP ´&$3µ  IRUIDOWHULQJ OHQGHUV143 The CAP
program differs from the cash infusion program under TARP in
at least two important ways, both of which increase the relative
´QDWLRQDOL]DWLRQµ RI WKH LQGXVWU\ First, CAP requires that
applicants undergo an examination of their books before
receiving investment, thereby increasing the amount of federal
regulatory oversight of the institutions.144 Second, it requires
the institutions to issue preferred stock in exchange for the
investment, thereby increasing government ownership of
formerly private enterprises.145 In short, CAP moves the
relationship between American society and its banks a little
further along the nationalization continuum, increasing the
historically ideologically distasteful role of the federal
140. Id.
141. Editorial, /RDQV"'LG:H6D\:H·G'R/RDQV", N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29,
2008, at A30. AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase, Wells
Fargo, Goldman Sachs, and Morgan Stanley are among the insurers,
commercial banks, and investment banks that have received cash infusions
under the TARP program. Participants in Government Investment Plan,
Washington Post, http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/st_BANK
MONEY_20081027.html (last visited on Nov. 8, 2009).
142. See Editorial, supra note 141.
143. See, e.g., U.S. DEP·T OF THE TREASURY, THE CAPITAL ASSISTANCE
PROGRAM AND ITS ROLE IN THE FINANCIAL STABILITY PLAN (2009), available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/tg40_capwhitepaper.pdf;;
FinancialStability.gov,
Capital
Assistance
Program,
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/capitalassistance.html (last
visited Oct. 8, 2009).
144. FinancialStability.gov, supra note 143.
145. Id.
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government in central planning and regulatory oversight. In
fact, many formerly staunch free-market supporters are now
urging the Obama Administration to assume controlling
interests in the banks that may be beyond saving through cash
infusions and greater regulatory oversight,146 and we have
already begun state ownership of massive parts of the formerly
privately-owned banking and housing finance industries.147
The United States is now the largest shareholder in both
Citigroup and Bank of America.148
B. Housing Finance Reforms
1. Re-Nationalization of Fannie Mae and Nationalization of
Freddie Mac
On September 6, 2008, Fannie Mae, burdened by its
disastrous foray into subprime lending and on the brink of total
collapse,149 was re-nationalized.150 Similarly, Freddie Mac was
nationalized.151 Now controlled by the Obama Administration
as agents of its housing finance reform agenda, their missions
have been substantially revised.152 They are now charged with

146. In the tongue-in-cheek words of economist Paul Krugman,
´&RPUDGH*UHHQVSDQZDQWVXVWRVHL]HWKHHFRQRP\·VFRPPDQGLQJKHLJKWVµ
Krugman, supra note 8. See also Matthew Richardson & Nouriel Roubini,
Outlook, 1DWLRQDOL]HWKH%DQNV:H·UHDOO6ZHGHV1RZ, WASH. POST, Feb. 15,
DW% ´$VIUHH-market economists teaching at a business school in the
KHDUW RI WKH ZRUOG·V ILQDQFLDO FDSLWDO ZH IHHO GRZQULJKW EODVSKHPRXV
proposing an all-out government takeover of the banking system. But the
U.S. financial system has reached such a dangerous tipping point that little
FKRLFHUHPDLQVµ 
147. See, e.g., Participants in Government Investment Plan, supra note
141.
148. Eric Dash, U.S. is Said to Agree to Raise Stake in Citigroup, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2009, at A1;; Eric Dash, Louise Story & Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Bank of America to Receive Additional $20 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 16, 2009,
at B1.
149. In 2008, Fannie Mae lost more than its net profit for the previous
sixteen years combined. Charles Duhigg, U.S. Likely to Keep the Reins on
Fannie and Freddie, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2009, at A1.
150. Stephen Labaton & Edmund L. Andrews, In Rescue to Stabilize
Lending, U.S. Takes Over Mortgage Finance Titans, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2008, at A1.
151. Id.
152. Duhigg, supra note 149.
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implementing the Making Home Affordable program,
restructuring mortgages to prevent foreclosures much in the
manner of the HOLC program during the Great Depression.153
Much like HOLC in 1934, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac now
find themselves as dominant and absolutely critical
participants in the housing finance system.154 It seems that
LGHRORJLFDOGLVWDVWHZKLFKOHGWR+2/&·VOLTXLGDWLRQDJDLQKDV
given way to pragmatic necessity.
III. De-Nationalization and Re-Nationalization in Other
Countries: A Comparative Perspective
,WLVLQWHUHVWLQJWRFRPSDUHWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV·UHODWLRQVKLS
with its banking and housing finance systems with the
relationships of other nations with their own systems. What
the comparison reveals is that even though different nations
may start with remarkably different ideological biases, their
relationships with banking and housing finance industries
exhibit the same tumultuous dynamic that characterizes the
United States. In times of crisis, ideology gives way to
pragmatic necessity. When the pragmatic steps necessary to
end crises succeed, ideological bias re-emerges until the next
crisis.
A. Canada
The Canadian banking system has weathered the current
economic crisis remarkably well. According to the World
Economic Forum, the Canadian banking system is the soundest
in the world.155 Ironically, the strength of the Canadian system
stems largely from the fact that it was modeled on the
Hamiltonian, centralized United States national bank

153. See
FinancialStability.gov,
Making
Home
Affordable,
http://www.financialstability.gov/roadtostability/homeowner.html
(last
visited July 16, 2009).
154. See id.;; see also Edmund L. Andrews, Mortgage Plan Targets up to
Four Million Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009.
155. WORLD ECON. FORUM, GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS REPORT 2008-2009,
at
129
(2008),
available
at
http://www.weforum.org/documents/GCR0809/index.html.
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system.156 Unlike the United States, however, Canada was not
persuaded by the ideological distaste for central planning that
led the United States to jettison the Hamiltonian system.
Canada, of course, has major private lending institutions, but
they are all chartered by the national government and
regulated accordingly.157
A major aspect of that regulation concerns home lending.
Most Canadian home mortgage loans are short-term and have
adjustable rates;; however, unless they are insured under the
National Housing Act, they require a 20% down-payment at
origination.158
The Canadian government pragmatically restricted the
riskiest home financing activities at the time those activities
were flourishing in the United States.159 Three factors in
particular led Canadian banks to avoid originating subprime
mortgage loans.160 First, Canadian banks, like British banks,
fund mortgage loans largely through deposits rather than
capital obtained in secondary markets.161 Second, Canadian
banks are required to keep higher capital reserves than their
American counterparts, reducing the capital on hand to lend
and increasing the incentive to lend it well.162 Third, Canadian
EDQNV NHHS PRUWJDJH ORDQV ´LQ-KRXVHµ UDWKHU WKDQ VHFXULWL]H
and sell them to others.163 As a result, Canadian banks had
little incentive to lend unwisely. Despite the fact that most
Canadian home mortgage loans are short-term and have
adjustable rates,164 the Canadian bank and home financing
systems have emerged as the soundest in the world during the

156. Theresa Tedesco, Op-Ed., The Great Solvent North, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2009, at A23.
157. Id.
158. FIN. CONSUMER AGENCY OF CAN., THE ABCS OF MORTGAGES,
http://www.acfc-fcac.gc.ca/eng/publications/mortgages/DownPayments-
eng.asp (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
159. Tedesco, supra note 156.
160. Id.
161. See Pietro S. Nivola & John C. Courtney, Know Thy Neighbor: What
Canada Can Tell Us About Financial Regulation, BROOKINGS INST., Apr. 23,
2009, available at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2009/0423_canada_
nivola.aspx.
162. Id.
163. Tedesco, supra note 156.
164. See id.
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current crisis.165
B. Sweden
6ZHGHQ LV WKH ELUWK SODFH RI WKH LQ IDPRXV ´7KLUG :D\µ
between capitalism and socialism.166 Perhaps it should not
come as a surprise then that the Swedish response to economic
crises has been characterized by anti-ideological pragmatism.
Today, many in the United States are calling for a response to
the current economic crisis modeled on the pragmatic Swedish
response to its crisis in the early 1990s.167
The Swedish model of nationalization is characterized by a
complete government takeover of private institutions for the
shortest amount of time as possible, after which they are
returned to the private market.168 When Swedish banks began
to collapse under the weight of toxic assets, the national
government established an institution called Securum, which
EHFDPH D KROGLQJ WDQN IRU EDQNV· WR[LF DVVHWV DQG LQ VRPH
cases, for entire banks.169 Banks were infused with capital so
that they could resume lending activities now controlled by the
national government.170 The Swedish state assumed ownership
of bank assets, wiping out existing shareholders, but returning
proceeds from liquidation to the Swedish treasury.171
Businesses that fell under government control, including
industrial companies, were eventually de-nationalized and
resumed private operations.172
C. Britain
If the United States is generally regarded as the most

165. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra 155, at 129.
166. See, e.g., PHILIP WHYMAN, SWEDEN AND THE ´7HIRD WAYµ (2003).
167. See Richardson & Roubini, supra note 146 ´%DVLFDOO\ ZH·UH DOO
Swedes now. We have used all our bullets, and the boogeyman is still
FRPLQJ/HW·VSXOORXWWKHED]RRNDDQGEHGRQHZLWKLWµ 
168. Carter Dougherty, 6ZHGHQ·V)L[IRU%DQNV1DWLRQDOL]H7KHP, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at B1.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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ardently free-market economy in the West, Britain is probably
VHFRQG$OWKRXJK%ULWDLQ·V/DERU3DUW\KDVLWVKLVWRULFDOURRWV
in socialism, Britain is, in fact, a relatively consistent, when
compared with much of industrial Europe, free-market
economy, even under Labor Party leadership. And although
the Bank of England is responsible for maintaining stability in
the financial system as a whole, its relationship to its troubled
banks has been relatively laissez-faire;; it has been British
SROLF\IRUWKHSDVW\HDUVWROHWLQGLYLGXDOLQVWLWXWLRQV´VLQN
RU VZLPµ RQ WKHLU RZQ173 The role envisaged for the Bank of
England is to provide loans to prevent the contagion of failure
from spreading to the banking system generally, but to let
banks in trouble fail. Yet in response to the current economic
crisis, the British government found itself, in the face of
enormous controversy, saving several major banks, including
Northern Rock, The Royal Bank of Scotland, and Barclays.174
More may be on the horizon.175
%ULWDLQ·V KRXVLQJ ILQDQFH V\VWHP DFWXDOO\ UHVHPEOHV WKH
pre-Depression U.S. system: home loans are usually funded by
deposits at banks rather than by capital obtained through
selling mortgages on a secondary market.176 In addition, most
home mortgage loans are adjustable-rate rather than fixed-
rate.177 As lending has decreased in response to the current
crisis, interest rates have increased, increasing the
vulnerability of British homeowners to foreclosure.178 As a
result, similar to what has happened in the United States, the
British government finds itself intervening to restructure
mortgage loans.

173. Alistair Milne & Geoffrey Wood, Banking Crisis Solutions Old and
New, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Sept./Oct. 2008, at 517, 524,
available
at
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/09/Milne.pdf.
174. UK Banks Receive £37bn Bail-Out, BBC NEWS, Oct. 13, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7666570.stm.
175. See id.
176. Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in
Historical and International Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 102 (Fall 2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=908976.
177. Id.
178. Julia Werdigier, Foreclosures Force Britons to Ponder Shift to Fixed
Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2007, at C1.
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D. France
Unlike either Canada or Sweden, but like Britain and the
United States, France in the 1980s was motivated in its
relationship with its banks primarily by ideology rather than
pragmatism. When Francois Mitterrand led the Socialist party
to control of the French government in 1981, he nationalized
banks as a matter of ideological preference rather than in
In fact, Mitterrand
response to a particular crisis.179
acknowledged that there was no purely economic justification
for the nationalizations.180 They were instead, he said, a
matter of principle, and that principle was embraced by French
policymakers on the Left.181
$V LQ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV EDVLQJ WKH QDWLRQ·V UHODWLRQVKLS
with its banking and financing industries on the basis of
ideology was untenable for France in the face of economic
crisis.182 France faced an acute economic crisis in the 1980s, in
part because lending activity was driven by political, rather
than economic, considerations.183 By the late 1980s, in a
pragmatic response to the economic crisis, moVW RI )UDQFH·V
banking system had been de-nationalized.184
IV. An Attempt at Conclusion and Explanation
Banking and housing are central to the life of any nation,
and that is particularly so of the United States, where the idea
of home-ownership is central to its self-image. As such, they
are too important to the economic life of a nation to be left
captive to ideology. Whether socialist or capitalist, societies
pragmatically nationalize, de-nationalize, and re-nationalize in
response to crises, then are swayed by ideology when they can

179. See generally David Cobham, The Nationalisation of the Banks in
0LWWHUDQG·V)UDQFH5DWLRQDOLVDWLRQVDQG5HDVRQV, 4 J. PUB. POL·Y 351 (1984).
180. ALISTAIR COLE, FRANCOIS MITTERRAND: A STUDY IN POLITICAL
LEADERSHIP 35 (1994).
181. Id. at 33-34.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. William L. Megginson, The Economics of Bank Privatization, 29 J.
BANKING & FIN. 1931, 1964 (2005). See generally id. GLVFXVVLQJ ´WKH
HPSLULFDOOLWHUDWXUHH[DPLQLQJEDQNSULYDWL]DWLRQµ 
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afford it. Ideology, in other words, is a luxury. It is a luxury
that we have repeatedly paid for in the United States, and at
great cost.
Unfortunately, this cycle shows no signs of abating.
Indeed, according to some commentators the question now is
not whether to nationalize, but when to de-nationalize.185 It
would perhaps be wiser to adopt the pragmatic, non-ideological
approach modeled in Canada, rather than continuously reverse
course in the face of crises. If that happened, there might be
fewer crises to face.

185. Posting of Simon Johnson to The Baseline Scenario,
http://baselinescenario.com/2009/02/23/privatize-the-banks-already/ (Feb. 23,
2009, 22:28).
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